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Investigating the effects of privatization in transition countries is the focus of a large body of 
current research. Generally, privatization stimulates private sector development, attracts 
foreign direct investment, fosters competition and contributes to the formation of stock markets. 
In addition, privatization may improve individual enterprises’ performance. This paper 
investigates the impact of privatization on Ukrainian firms’ productivity. The empirical 
research is based on a sample of 466 Ukrainian joint-stock enterprises for the period of 1997 – 
1999. Estimation results indicate that privatization positively influences labor productivity, but 
also that these effects diminish over time. 
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During the last decade, governments in countries of Eastern and Central Europe, as well as in 
CIS countries, have launched large-scale privatization programs. Privatization policy implies 
reducing the government’s role in regulation of economic processes, and decline in the share of 
state property in the country’s national wealth. This policy is considered to be one of the most 
important elements of transition from state to market economy (Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 
1999; Megginson and Netter, 2000). Most policy advisors and academic economists suggest 
that privatization is the corner stone of the structural reforms, because it stimulates private 
sector development in the country, attracts FDI inflows, fosters competition, promotes 
liberalization of trade, favors the development of capital and product markets, and contributes 
to the development of stock markets and corporate governance systems. Specifically, it is also 
argued that privatization significantly affects operating and financial performance of 
enterprises (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Megginson and Netter, 2000; Djankov and Murrel, 
2000). 
However, the empirical evidence on privatization in transition countries is quite contradictory.  
While some research presents positive results of privatization (mainly in countries of Central 
Europe and the Baltic States), there exist other studies reporting weak correlation between 
privatization and improvements in firm performance.
1 For Ukraine, a large transitional country, 
the evidence on the effects of privatization so far is rather mixed. Along with the launching of 
the stabilization program in the country in the early 1990s, the Ukrainian government has made 
                                                 
1 Studies finding beneficial effects of privatization in transition countries include Claessens and Djankov (1998, 
1999) and Megginson et. al. (1994). Studies that find no clear evidence for positive effects include Nellis (1999), 
Frydman, et. al. (1998), Black, et. al. (2000). Megginson and Netter (2000) present a review of both theoretical 
and empirical literature. Privatization in Ukraine    3 
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great efforts towards privatization (Paskhaver, 2000; Chechetov, 2000). Despite the fact that 
the relevant legislation
2 was adopted with ambitious privatization goals, the privatization 
process has not been as speedy and successful as it was expected by many policy makers (IMF, 
1999; EBRD, 1999). The reasons for that are quite common in transitional countries of the 
former USSR (World Bank, 1999). Complicated implementation procedures, inherited non-
efficient structure of industries, enterprises accustomed to a state order system, weak incentives 
for profit maximizing behavior, non-transparency of the legal and business environment, and 
excessive bureaucracy in the highest bodies of power have all contributed to continued 
blockage of progress in privatization. Nevertheless, there is some evidence for positive effects 
of privatization.
3 
Therefore, we would like to further investigate the impact of ownership, specifically 
privatization, on operating efficiency of Ukrainian enterprises. Our data consists of a sample of 
466 joint-stock companies over a three-year period starting from 1997. The research focuses on 
joint-stock companies only, but we believe that this will not distort our results in a significant 
way, since the vast majority of privatized firms in Ukraine are collectively owned enterprises
4. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
Ukrainian privatization process. In Section 3, the data and model specification are presented. 
Section 4 contains the regression results and concludes.  
 
                                                 
2 The Law of Ukraine “On Privatization of the State Property”, No. 2613-12, 4 March 1992, the Law of Ukraine 
“On Privatization Certificates”, No. 2713-12, 6 March 1992. Presidential Decree “On Expedient Measures to 
Accelerate Privatization in Ukraine”, No. 1626; December, 29, 1999.   
3 See, for example, Grygorenko (2001). 
4 According to UEPLAC (2001) definition, ‘enterprises of “collective” ownership are enterprises (earlier leased 
with the right of buy-out) bought by workers or classical joint-stock companies (closed or open)’. Firms of this 
group generated about 70 percent of total output of Ukraine in the year 2000 (Derzhkomstat, 2000). Privatization in Ukraine    4 
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2. Ukrainian Background 
The process of privatization in Ukraine has begun in 1992, when the Ukrainian Parliament 
approved the relevant legislation and the first State Privatization Program
5. At that time, 
privatization was the major item on the agenda of Ukrainian reformers — the first step in the 
process of transition to a market economy (Yekhanurov, 2000). Political reasons were the 
primary determinants shaping privatization strategy. Low popularity of reforms among 
Ukrainians, the dominance of communist bureaucracy in the highest bodies of power, lack of 
private capital — all these seemed to contribute to the impossibility of “big-bang” reforms. A 
mass privatization approach was chosen in order to provide the fastest transfer of ownership 
from public to private hands, and to guarantee the irreversibility of transition reforms 
(Roland, 2000).  
The Ukrainian voucher privatization was carried out with substantial distortions, which 
caused some negative impacts for the whole privatization process. The idea of a “fair” 
distribution of property rights among all citizens of Ukraine obviously could not help in 
implementing one of the primary goals of privatization — improvement of enterprise 
efficiency. A diluted ownership structure which was formed as a result of mass privatization 
(Akimova and Schwödiauer, 2000; Yekhanurov, 2000) led to deteriorative effects on 
monitoring and incentives of managers. Employees and managers of enterprises were granted 
advantages in the privatization process, and this distortion led to the emergence of so-called 
“insider”-controlled firms
6 (Yekhanurov, 2000). Consequently, managers have little 
incentive to launch efficiency enhancing restructuring programs, fearing that this process will 
                                                 
5 Verkhovna Rada. The State Privatization Program for 1992. No. 2545-XII, July, 7, 1992 
6 According to the survey of Institute of Reform and London Business School, insiders (employees, former 
employees, and managers) still own 55% of statutory funds of Ukrainian joint-stock companies, while outsiders 
own 35%. Remaining 10% belong to the state. (Ukrainska Investytsiyna Gazeta, September, 13, 2000 ).  Privatization in Ukraine    5 
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lead to lay-offs of workers (also shareholders). Furthermore, the free circulation of 
privatization certificates was prohibited. Illegal forms of circulation have contributed to the 
enlargement of the unofficial sector of the economy (Paskhaver, 2000). Finally, overall 
bureaucratization of the mass privatization process and lack of transparency also blocked 
successful reforms.  
The goals of the next stage of privatization (cash sales or “privatization for money“), as 
declared in the State Privatization Program for 1999
7, were also quite contradictory. On the 
one hand, the State Property Fund of Ukraine (SPFU) should follow a policy of case-by-case 
privatization, i.e. an individual approach to each enterprise’s privatization plan. In other 
words, when choosing the method of privatization and determining the price of an object, the 
SPFU should take into account regional and sectoral peculiarities of the enterprise in 
question, market conditions in which it operates, its financial standing, etc. At the same time, 
the Program declared the generation of additional income for the state budget as one of the 
main purposes for selling state enterprises. 
Volatility of the general political situation additionally hinders this privatization progress. 
Since the start of privatization, the government changed seven times while the composition 
of the Parliament – the Verkhovna Rada - changed three times. After the parliament elections 
of 1994, when communists won a considerable number of seats in the Verkhovna Rada, the 
privatization process slowed down significantly. A moratorium on privatization was imposed 
starting from July 1994 and lasting until May 1995. Initial plans to privatize about 30,000 
enterprises in 1994 were fulfilled by only a quarter (Yekhanurov, 2000). In addition, the 
Parliament issued a list of enterprises prohibited from privatization (and the number of 
                                                 
7 Verkhovna Rada. The State Privatization Program for 1999. No. 209/99, February, 24, 1999 Privatization in Ukraine    6 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
enterprises in this list constantly grew)
8. The process of selection of these enterprises was 
non-transparent and initiated primarily by the branch ministries which had these enterprises 
under jurisdiction. Besides, managers of enterprises often resisted privatization, because 
staying a state-owned enterprise offered a lot of privileges and benefits: fixed level of wages, 
stable employment, soft-budget constraints and state orders providing stable demand on 
output. 
Furthermore, an additional list of “strategic enterprises” was set up
9. Enterprises in this group 
are monopolists (or hold at least 35% of their product market
10). Since 1994, legislation 
concerning the status of these entities was changed several times. Nowadays they are subject to 
privatization, but the state retains either a blocking minority (>25%) or a controlling share 
(>50%) in these enterprises.  In the year 2000, the Ukrainian state still held substantial 
ownership shares in more than 2,500 joint-stock companies (Chechetov, 2000).
11 
Ukraine still has a relatively high level of state interference in the economy. Despite the 
proclaimed statements about privatizing the economy (State Privatization Programs
12), the 
Ukrainian government, in fact, does not move quickly with effective reforms. In summary, we 
can outline the following major features of the Ukrainian privatization process so far. Mass 
privatization resulted in a widely dispersed ownership, which negatively influenced quality of 
                                                 
8 Resolution of Verkhovna Rada “List of Enterprises Prohibited from Privatization”. No. 847-XIV, July, 7, 1999. 
Earlier versions: No. 334a/95, May, 1995; No. 542-96, November, 96; No. 203-98, March 98.  
9  Resolution of Verkhovna Rada “List of Enterprises that Have Strategic Importance for the Economy and State 
Security”. No. 1346, August, 29, 2000. Earlier versions: No. 911, August, 21, 1997; No. 1151, July, 27, 1998; 
No. 801, May, 10, 1999; No. 1157, June, 29, 1999; No. 317, February, 16, 2000. 
10 Antimonopoly Committee Instruction “On Criteria for Defining an Enterprises as a Monopolist”, No. 1-p, March, 
10, 1994 
11 
12 Such Privatization Programs were adopted for following periods: 1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000-2002. In 1998 
such Program were rejected by the Parliament.  Privatization in Ukraine    7 
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monitoring, and consequently, incentives of managers. Preferential buy-outs by workers’ 
collectives led to insider-dominated ownership. The state still owns large stakes in partially 
privatized enterprises. The whole privatization process can be characterized as non-transparent 
and bureaucratized. 
Information on decomposition of Ukraine’s industrial output, employment and number of 
enterprises by ownership type is given in Table 1 in the appendix. There are four different types 
of ownership: state-owned enterprises, collectively-owned companies, private firms, and other 
forms of ownership. The first group, state-owned enterprises, mainly comprises those 
enterprises which are prohibited from privatization according to Ukrainian legislation. Their 
exclusion from the sample should not distort the results since our aim is to analyze privatization 
effects. Private firms are mostly de-novo created private entities, and are also excluded from our 
sample. The only group which is of interest to us is that of collectively-owned companies. It 
consists mainly of joint-stock companies (JSC) — a group of which our sample is 
representative. JSCs may be separated into two categories: privatized companies, and state-
owned enterprises which were incorporated but not privatized (SOE). Both categories are 
represented in the sample. This sample structure allows us to compare the performance of 
privatized and state-owned enterprises, and analyze the impact of privatization on enterprise 
performance. 
 
3. Data and Model Description 
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 466 Ukrainian industrial open joint-stock 
companies. Annual reports of enterprises for the period of 1997–1999 include balance sheets, 
income statements, and information on ownership structure and number of employees. Data 
for estimation came from two sources. The first part of it, namely annual reports of Privatization in Ukraine    8 
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enterprises for 1997 – 1998, is taken from the database provided by the Institute for 
Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IERPC). This dataset includes 1694 firms. The 
second part (namely, reports for 1999) comes from reports of the Securities and Stock 
Market State Commission (SSMSC)
13. While more than five thousand enterprise reports are 
available, our sample consists only of industrial enterprises which provided their annual 
reports for all three years. The total number of observations in the panel is 1398.  In the 
appendix (Table 3), the decomposition of the sample by industries and ownership types is 
presented. 
Unfortunately, our sample may be subject to some selection bias for the following reasons. 
Firstly, only open joint-stock companies are required to make their annual reports publicly 
available. Data on closed JSCs and non-incorporated state-owned enterprises are 
inaccessible. Furthermore, the fact that some enterprises have been providing their reports 
only for one or two years (and therefore, are excluded from the sample) may lead to 
additional distortions. Therefore, the results of this study should be taken with caution; they 
should not be generalized to apply to the whole set of Ukrainian enterprises. 
The sample only includes state-owned, partially privatized, and fully privatized industrial 
enterprises. De-novo created private firms are excluded from the sample in order to capture 
the particular effects of privatization on the activity of previously existing enterprises. 
Privatized enterprises in the sample (in which the state owns less than 50% shares) amount to 
348 enterprises in 1997, 359 in 1998 and 396 in 1999 (74.68%, 77.04%, and 84.98% of the 
total number of firms in the sample, respectively).  
As a measure of performance, we use growth in labor productivity (measured as the natural 
                                                 
13 http://www.ssmsc.gov.ua  Privatization in Ukraine    9 
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logarithm of net sales per employee, ln(PROD), deflated by the producer price index
14). Our 
labor productivity measure is commonly used in similar empirical research.
15 As independent 
variables we used the regressors listed below: 
LAB represents the number of employees. CAP is capital used in production. 
We assume that each enterprise in our sample has a production function of the Cobb-Douglas 
type  i i i i A L K A L K Q
β α = ) , , ( ,   (1) 
where K — capital used; L — labor used; A — other factors specific to each firm; i — firm’s 
index (i = 1 .. 466),  β α + ≤ 1; α > 0; β > 0. 
As a measure of performance we use growth in net sales per employee: 
i i i
i
i A L K
L
Q






β α .   (2) 
Following this technique, the coefficient of the ln(LAB) variable should have a negative sign 
and the coefficient of the ln(CAP) variable should have positive sign. The variable ln(Ai) in 
this case incorporates all other factors that influence the performance of enterprises described 
below. 
DEBT is a leverage ratio which is included in the regression in order to capture some internal 
sources for performance variation. To some extent, it can reflect the quality of management, 
or the ability of managers to attract funds. This variable, however, may have a dual meaning. 
On the one hand, high debt to assets ratio testifies that a firm is successful in attracting 
external funding which then can be invested in some profitable projects, and, therefore, can 
have positive influence on performance. On the other hand, over-leverage of an enterprise 
                                                 
14 Source: Ukrainian Economic Trends, UEPLAC, January 2001 
15 The logic behind this is intuitive — privatized enterprises use labor more efficiently, and thus have higher rates of 
productivity growth (Bevan, et. al., 1999).  Privatization in Ukraine    10 
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can cause some ill-incentives for managers to invest in projects which are, in fact, 
deteriorating to enterprise performance. Besides, a high debt to assets ratio can lead to 
liquidity problems. So, the net impact on firm’s productivity and profitability is ambiguous. 
The dummy variable SOE is set to one for firms where the state owns more than 50 percent 
of the joint stock. 
The STATE variable represents the percentage of shares which belong to the state.  
The COMP dummy is used in order to control for the degree of competitiveness in the 
market environment. Higher competitiveness should improve firm productivity. As a proxy 
for the competitiveness of the environment, we calculated weighted Hirschman-Herfindahl 
concentration ratios using output data provided by Derzhkomstat, the Statistical Committee 





jt jt jt HHI OShare HHI OShare COMP × − + × = ) 1 ( , (3) 
where   j is an index for industries; t  is a time index (t = 1997..1999);  jt OShare  is a 
proportion of oblasts, in which there is at least one enterprise of the industry j; 
R
jt HHI  is a 
concentration ratio at the regional level (oblasts level); 
N
jt HHI is a concentration ratio at the 
national level (country level). 
The variable YEAR represents the number of years since privatization. We consider an 
enterprise as privatized if more than 50% of its shares belong to private owners. Therefore, 
even if the privatization process could have begun earlier, YEAR is equal to one in the next 
year after the state sold more than 50% of shares. For enterprises which are not privatized 
YEAR takes a value of zero. This variable is expected to have positive influence on 
enterprise’s performance. The intuition behind this is quite clear: restructuring of a firm 
                                                 
16 A similar index was used by Brown and Earle (2001). Privatization in Ukraine    11 
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needs time to be implemented, for instance, change of manager, reduction in the staff, or 
replacement of fixed assets. Therefore, in measuring the overall impact of privatization on 
enterprise performance we should take into account the influence of this variable. 
A decomposition of enterprises in the sample by industries is presented in Table 3 in the 
appendix. Descriptive statistics on some variables used in our model are presented in the 
appendix, Table 4. 
Finally, the equation to be estimated takes the following form: 
 
  (4) 
where  i — index for i
th firm (i = 1,…, 466), t — year index (t = 1997, 1998, 1999). 
 
4. Results and Conclusions 
 Our final estimated fixed-effects model takes the form: 
Ln(prod)it = αI - 0.57 ln(LAB)it + 0.12 ln(CAP)it – 0.24 SOEit + 0.003 STATEit  
 +  0.59  DEBTit + 0.45 COMPit – 0.13 YEARit + γ + uit  (5) 
where the parameter estimate for β6 (COMP) is significant at the 6 percent level while all other 
estimates are significant at the 1 percent level. (See Table 5 in the appendix for details of this 
estimation.)  
The influences of the production factors labor and capital on labor productivity are negative 
and positive, respectively, as expected. Similarly, labor productivity is positively influenced by 
increased competition. The positive sign of the parameter for the debt-to-asset ratio indicates 
that this variable may represent mostly positive effects of credit availability on firm 
it t it
it it it it it it i it
u YEAR
COMP DEBT STATE SOE CAP LAB PROD
+ +
+ + + + + + + =
γ β
β β β β β β α
7
6 5 4 3 2 1   ) ( ) ln( ) ln(
 Privatization in Ukraine    12 
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performance. As expected, majority state ownership indicates significantly worse performance 
(see the parameter on SOE). Hence privatization, even if not to 100 percent, increases 
performance if it leads to majority private ownership. The negative sign for the effect of 
number of years since privatization may indicate that privatization benefits decrease over 
time.
17 
Interestingly enough, even though private firms perform better than state-owned firms, 
performance seems to increase with the percentage of state-ownership. This probably indicates 
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Table 1. Relative Importance of Different Ownership Types.  
  Ukraine 
(total) 
Including: 









10,527 1,495  8,837  145  50 
% 100%  14.2%  83.9% 1.4%  0.5% 
Employment 
(workers) 
4,622,144 1,440,070  3,160,892  12,460  8,722 




103,783.6 31,547.9  71,435.4  274.7  525.6 
% 100%  30.4%  68.8% 0.3%  0.5% 
Source: Derzhkomstat. 2000. Statistics bulletin  
 
Table 2. List of Regressors. 
REGRESSORS  MEASUREMENT 
LAB  labor used  (number of employees)  
CAP  capital used (UAH thousand) 
DEBT    debt to asset ratio 
SOE  Joint-stock enterprises with more than 50% state 
holdings 
STATE  ownership variable (% of shares which belong to the 
state) 
COMP  competition variable (measured as concentration ratio of 
the corresponding market) 
YEAR  years since privatization (equal to zero if an enterprise is 
not privatized) 















  1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999  
Fuel  industry  7 7 5 2 2 3 0 0 1 27 
Power  industry  16  16  14  5 5 7 3 3 3 72 
Ferrous  metallurgy  16 14 12 6  6  7  13 15 16 105 
Non-ferrous 
metallurgy 





9 9 8 4 4 3 16  16  18 
87 
Machine-building    31 29 18 29 30 29 71 72 84 393 
Wood, Pulp and 
Paper industries 




10  9 6 4 5 3 42  42  47 
168 
Light  industry  1 1 0 4 4 3 15  15  17  60 
Food  industry  23 17 5  24 27 26 85 88 101  396 
Other    0 0 0 3 3 4 7 7 6 30 




Table 4. Descriptive statistics of some variables 
  Mean Median Maximum  Minimum  Standard 
Deviation 
PROD 20.3656  10.1425 1187.216  0  54.32348 
LAB 1596.27  420.5  26059  4  3346.507 
CAP 70119.8  7417.8 1936739 0  187870.9 
STATE 21.8772 0  100  0  32.97962 
DEBT 0.25071  0.18245 1.467  0.00276  0.214386 
COMP  0.39676  0.38072  1 0 0.236592 
YEAR  2.06871  2  6 0 1.444294 Privatization in Ukraine, Appendix    17 
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Table 5. Estimation Results. Eviews Output 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PROD?)   
Method: Pooled Least Squares     
Date: 10/24/04   Time: 13:34     
Sample: 1997 1999     
Included observations: 3     
Cross-sections included: 466     
Total pool (unbalanced) observations: 1354   
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 4.502680  0.569834 7.901747 0.0000
LOG(LAB?) -0.577019  0.062274 -9.265756 0.0000
LOG(CAP?) 0.127751  0.028537 4.476666 0.0000
STATE? 0.003391  0.000259 13.08655 0.0000
SOE? -0.236028  0.029210 -8.080501 0.0000
DEBT? 0.585358  0.067614 8.657396 0.0000
COMP? 0.454846  0.239180 1.901690 0.0575
YEAR? -0.126657  0.024157 -5.242978 0.0000
Fixed Effects (Period)         
1997--C 0.108755       
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 Effects  Specification     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)   
Period fixed (dummy variables)   
R-squared  0.889880     Mean dependent var  2.203093
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S.E. of regression  0.543104     Akaike info criterion  1.886560
Sum squared resid  259.2717     Schwarz criterion  3.714580
Log likelihood  -802.2012     F-statistic  14.98571
Durbin-Watson stat  2.207071     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
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